FIFTY YEARS AGO....
Part 5.....Courtesy of THE HOOK Magazine
PHIL SEA was in Yokosuka from February 22 to March 17, 1952, where her officers and men enjoyed rest and recreation while the ship got a needed bit of upkeep. On March 11, 1952, Rear Admiral Apollo Soucek, Commander Carrier Division 3 and his staff came on board, making PHILIPPINE SEA a flagship once more. Rejoining TF-77 on March 19,1952, she resumed her interdiction and close air support tasks the following day. During this period CVG-11 expended approximately 1,200 tons of bombs, rockets and machine gun ordnance.
PHILIPPINE SEA detached from TF-77 on April 16,1952 and repaired to Yokosuka
where she spent the next 27 days. Resuming operations on May 14th, the carrier launched
strikes the following day. Between mid-May and June 4, 1952, CV-47 hurled 1,180 sorties
against the enemy, in the perennial effort to interdict communist transportation and
communications. She also hammered industrial and supply facilities, pay special attention
to the North Korean railroad system. After a visit to Yokosuka, she conducted CarQuals on
the 16th of June for McDonnell F2H-2P Banshees, which now equipped part of VC-61. Before
the ship left Japanese waters, VADM Jocko Clark, COMSEVENTHFLT embarked on June 20th to
observe operations. The following day PHIL SEA sailed to rejoin TF-77 as SEVENTH FLEET
Flagship.
At this time, the Korean War had been dragging on for two years, and one year of truce
talks at Panmunjom had accomplished nothing. Negotiating a cease fire with the communists
did not appear likely, nor did the prospect of invading and subduing North Korea. The war
appeared stalemated and the interdiction campaign against enemy supply traffic appeared to
be something less than a success. Such efforts had mired into dull routine-day in and day
out, described as "ceaseless and unspectacular" duty.
The most coveted targets-North Korean hydroelectric power plants along the Chinese border-lay untouched. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had placed these Yalu River powerplants out of bounds early in the war. Hoping to occupy North Korea and avoid needless destruction to be good in reconstruction of the conquered enemy's homeland, the plants had not been bombed. After the daring landing at Inchon in September, the plans had been spared to deny the Chinese an excuse for intervening; after China did enter the war, the plants were not bombed so as not to "prejudice the course of the armistice negotiations."
By the time PHILIPPINE SEA was on her way back to TF-77, the Commander in Chief, Far East, General Mark Clark, had decided upon something that would "make the communists realize that we are still fighting." Since the powerplants along the Yalu provided electrical power to run the enemy's radar network and factories, Clark decided that those key hydroelectric works had to be put out of action. He informed the JCS of his intentions with a detailed plan of attack. Upon JCS approval of the mission, VADM Clark in Tokyo did not hesitate to venture his opinion that Bombing the hydroelectric plant at Suiho-a major source of power for Manchurian industry-was a "Navy-job." He offered 36 Skyraiders, each armed with a 5,000 bomb load.
As PHIL SEA steamed back to Korean waters with VADM Clark embarked, the Admiral decided to go to Seoul and personally plead the Navy's case. He soon learned that concern over possible MIG interference might scrub the Suiho mission. Additionally, the Navy's contribution had been whittled down to 20 ADs. COMSEVENTHFLT personally appealed for the Navy to hit Suiho, not with 20 ADs but with the 36 he had originally offered. "We ought to send as heavy a strike as possible" Clark insisted, "and really clobber that dam." Jocko's persistence helped carry the day.
Round the clock planning for the Suiho mission proceeded a pace, under the direction of the strike leader, CDR A.L. Downing, CAG-2 in BOXER (CV-21). The pilots would fly the mission digested the intelligence data and labored under no illusions as to what lay ahead. It would be rough but a welcome change from the drudgery of "working on the railroads." PHILIPPINE SEA and BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) arrived on the scene on June 23 1952 joining BOXER (CV-21) and PRINCETON (CV-37). For the first time in 18 months, four Fleet Carriers were operating together off the Korean coast.
At 1400 June 23, 1952, the carriers commenced launching the biggest strike of the war at the time: 35 SKYRAIDERS from BOXER's VA-65, PRINCETON's VA195, and PHIL SEA's VA-115. The latter under CDR C.H. Carr, were to attack the hitherto untouched hydroelectric plants. Thirty-one of the ADs hauled a pair of 2,000-pounders and one 1,000-pounder. The other four each carried two 2,000-pounders and one "survival bomb" containing survival gear if anyone was shot down. In addition, 35 F9Fs flew cover: BOXER's VF-24, PRINCETON's VF-191 and PHILIPPINE SEA's VF-112, the latter led by CDR James V. Rowney. Two dozen of the Panthers carried two 250-lb general purpose (GP) bombs and a full ammunition load. Providing top cover of "MIG ALLEY" were 84 USAF North American F-86 Sabres.
Taking the enemy completely by surprise, the flak-suppression F9Fs led the way while the ADs reversed course and commenced their runs. With the Suiho powerhouse providing an excellent aiming point (a building 80 ft by 500 ft), the Navy strike delivered more than 85 tons of bombs in less than two minutes, attacking the powerhouse and the nearby transformer yard and penstocks. They cleared the area with only 5 planes hit by anti-aircraft fire, and all but one returned to their carriers. The exception was an AD4 from VA-115. The pilot LTJG M.K. Lake, managed a wheels-up landing at Kimpo airfield near Seoul. Hard on the heels of the carrier strike, 124 Republic F-84G Thunderjets dished out more punishment to the enemy.
The Suiho strike - one of many aimed at the North Korean power plants that day - was executed like a textbook hop. Although only one pre-strike briefing had been held, the mission went off "as though we had been doing it for year." Post-strike photographs, VADM Clark declared, "showed no misses." The powerhouse, in particular, had been hard-hit. As Art Downing stated, it "looked like a volcano erupting." The raid paralyzed not only Pyongyang, the enemy capital, but factories on both sides of the Yalu River; it disrupted the power system of North Korea and Manchuria and forced the relocation of anti-aircraft guns defending other key targets. More importantly, the strike implanted serious concern in the minds of the enemy who lost no time in denouncing the "sneak attacks" on a "project of peaceful construction devoid of all military significance" as to what targets would be next.
For the remainder of PHIL SEA's second Korean deployment, her planes hammered at hydroelectric complexes and industrial installations, in addition to carry out limited rail interdiction and destruction of truck shelters. Homeward bound on July 12, 1952 the ship reached San Diego on August 8, where, soon thereafter, Captain Paul H. Ramsey relieved CAPT Smith as Commanding Officer.
Following limited availability and local operations off Southern California,
PHILIPPINE SEA - reclassified as an attack aircraft carrier (CVA-47) on October 1, 1952,
returned to the Far East. She sailed December 15, 1952 with Air Group Nine (VF-91, 93 and
94, VA-95, detachments from VC-3, 11, 35 & 61 and a unit of HU-1) embarked. However,
damage to one screw forced emergency repairs at Pearl Harbor that delayed the ship's
arrival in Yokosuka almost one month. Relieving sistership U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA-9), PHIL SEA
and her men returned to the joyless work of attempting to sever North Korean supply and
transportation arteries. CVG9 launched its first strikes from CVA-47s deck on January 31,
1953. She performed interdiction and CAS duties into the spring.
Go to next..